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I. Introduction

Though Plato never wrote a dialogue that explicitly asks
"What is education?" few argue that he is uninterested in the
subject; after all, Plato, like Socrates, was a teacher.l In his
magnum opus, the Republic, Plato deals with education repeat
edly. The education of the guardian class and the allegory of
the cave present two landmark pedagogical passages. Yet to
catch a glimpse of Socratic pedagogy, we must first sift
through the intricacies of dialogue. In addition to the com
plexity inherent in dramatic context, it seems clear that
Socrates' remarks are often steeped inirony.2 Thus, we stumble
upon a problem: how should we read these passages on
education? Does Plato mean for us to read them genuinely or
ironically?
I will argue that Plato uses the dramatic context of the
Republic to suggest that Socrates presents the education of the
guardians ironically, while reserving the allegory of the cave
for a glimpse of Socrates' genuine pedagogy. The first portion
of this paper will analyze various dramatic elements that
indicate Socrates' ironic intent with respect to the education
of the guardians. The second portion will focus on the alle
gory of the cave as Socrates' genuine conception of ideal
paideia (or education).
II. Dramatic Context and the Introduction of Irony
A. Conventional Irony
Unfortunately, we cannot look at Plato's treatise on edu
cation to learn about his educational theory because he does
not write analytical treatises. Instead, Plato employs written
dialogues to inspire philosophical insight in his students. In
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light of Plato's dialogical style, the dramatic context intro
duces new complexities to the project of figuring out Socratic
pedagogy.
While many may find Plato's drama a refreshing alterna
tive to the dry argumentation of a treatise, it is likely that
Plato's purposes are not limited to reading ease. In fact, in
many ways the use of drama makes reading Plato a great deal
more complex. Plato certainly makes use of arguments, yet
frames them in real life contexts. Thus, the reader must
consider not only the nuances of argumentation, but also the
characters' abilities and motives behind presenting the argu
ment in a particular way. So the argument should not neces
sarily be taken at face val ue; instead, such arguments must be
read within the dramatic context. 3 The dramatic context
furnishes readers with invaluable clues for interpreting the
arguments presented and will provide the interpretative
framework for this paper.
At the very least, the dramatic context of Plato's dia
logues introduces the use of conventional irony. By conven
tional irony I simply mean that the implicit truth pronounced
within the work is different than what is explicitly said; there
is a separation between whatis said and what is meant. Thus,
the reader's approach in reading a dialogue differs signifi
cantly from the approach required by a treatise or an exposi
tion. Rather than simply comprehending the words and
stringing together the explicit argument put forth in a trea
tise, the reader of Plato's dialogues must move beyond the
words and view the drama to ascertain Plato's genuine
meaning. One way to determine whether something is ironic
is to observe whether the events within the dialogue, that is,
the drama, match up with what is said in the dialogue. If
Socrates makes a comment about the way things are, do the
events in the dialogue demonstrate the veracity of his propo
sition? In short, does the drama match the argument?
Drew Hyland proposes several valuable heuristics for
identifying irony within a Platonic dialogue. First, Hyland
recommends determining the plausibility of what is said.
The less plausible the statement, the more likely it is ironic.
Second, does the potentially ironic statement fit with other
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statements in the dialogue? To the extent that the statement
seems an anomaly or breaks the internal consistency of the
dialogue, it is likely ironic. Third, is the statement consistent
with the rest of Plato's dialogues. Is Socrates speaking in
character? If Socrates says something that radically contra
dicts the body of his philosophy as presented in the Platonic
corpus, there is good reason to believe he is speaking ironi
cally (Hyland 331-3). While these clues are notfoolproof, they
do provide dues for effectively approaching Socratic irony.
B. Mimetic Irony
Though conventional irony certainly plays a significant
role in Socratic pedagogy, it is not the only type of irony
. Socrates employs. Among the most popular of the tools in
Socrates' repertoire is mimetic irony. Mitchell Miller de
scribes the process of mimetic irony in this way:

In each case the philosopher holds back from giving
explicit, authoritative criticism and instead puts the
interlocutor on stage before himself. This reticence
and indirectness preserves for the latter the possibil
ity of self-confrontation, of coming by his own action
to recognize his ignorance and his need for philoso
phy. (Miller 4-5)
Rather than using his position of authority to correct the
misguided notions of a student, the teacher who uses mi
metic irony takes on the student's mistaken views in hopes
that the student will see the mistakes in his own thinking
when observing it in his teacher. Thus, the student confronts
the error of his ways while the teacher just serves as a mime.
But according to Miller, while Socrates' student is hopefully
reaping the benefits of mimetic irony, Plato hopes that his
students - the readers - will also use this opportunity for
self-examina tion:
In each case, however, the tacit challenge to the audi
ence is basically the same; the hearer is invited to
recognize himself, actually or potentially, in the fig
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ure on stage. If the hearer can do so, then the elenchtic
action of the dialogue will have an internal signifi
cance for him; Socrates' examination of the interlocu
tor will be, for the hearer, an opportunity for self
examination. (Miller 5)
Whether the student resides inside or outside of the dialogue,
mimetic irony hinges on the belief that if the student realizes
his own error (as opposed to the teacher explicitly pointing it
out to him), then the new philosophic notion presented
thereafter will have greater "iI).ternal significance."
III. Mimetic Irony in the Education of the Guardian Class
The education of the guardian class may very well be the
most explicit account of education in the Republic. So it makes
sense to examine this account with an eye to Socratic peda
gogy. However, prudence dictates that we proceed cau
tiously; for as we have established, Plato's drama proves a
indispensable tool when attempting to glean his genuine
views.
The need for guardians arises in the fleshing out of the
"feverish city" (Republic 372e). However, it is not altogether
clear that the feverish city is what Socrates has in mind from
the beginning. In fact, the entire constTuction of the feverish
city arises out of an intelTuption from Glaucon: IIlyou seem
to make these men have their feast without relishes'" (Repub
lic 372c). It seems as though Glaucon approaches the philo
sophical question of developing tl1e ideal city as a sort of
fantasy. In this light, Socrates' construction seems to curi
ously leave out the pleasures and luxuries that are desirable
in an fantastic city. Wait a minute, thinks Glaucon, if we are
going to fantasize about an ideal city, why not include the
luxuries? Socrates' response is interesting. He does not re
buke Glaucon for thinking so shallowly nor even gently
redirect him toward the original conception of the ideal dty.
Instead, he asks, '''Well, how should it be, Glaucon?"' (Repub
lic 372d). Perhaps, Sacra tes is interested in allowing Glaucon
to reach his own conclusions rather than mindlessly swal
lowing the conclusions of his mentor. If this is indeed the
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case, we can more clearly see the mimetic irony with which
Socrates portrays the feverish city, or city of pigs; for it seems
that mindless acceptance is just the sort of education that is
encouraged in this paradigm. Socrates goes to great lengths
to emphasize that censorship should be used generously to
prohibit the possibility of dangerous conclusions by the
guardians. Regardless, Socrates indulges Glaucon' s whim 
but not without first admitting that this city of pigs is not at
all what he had in mind: 'IIN ow, the true city is in my opinion
the one we just described - a healthy city, as it were. But, if
you want to, let's look at a feverish city, too' (Republic 372e).
But Socrates' ironic comments aboutthe city of pigs4 does not
stop at its inception; the entire description of the city is rife
with ironic and disparaging comments. Remarks like [t]his
healthy one (city) isn't adequate any more, but must be
gorged with a bulky mass of things, which are not in cities
because of necessity ...1IJ typify Socrates' attitude toward the
new endeavor (Republic 373b). Furthermore, we can be more
confident about reading the feverish city ironically in light of
Socrates' ascetic attitude toward pleasures of the body. For
example, in Book VI of the Republic, Socrates states that a
philosopher '''...would be concerned with the pleasure of the
soul itself with respect to itself and would forsake those
pleasures that come through the body - if he isn't a counter
feit but a true philosopher'" (Republic 485d). In the Sympo
sium, Socrates stands contemplatively for twenty-four hours
disregarding the bodily desires for food or sleep (Symposium
220c-d). Again, in the Symposium, Socrates pertinaciously
fends off the bodily desire to have sex with Alcibiades, who
is among the most attractive in the land, despite Alcibiades
attempts to seduce him (Symposium 217b-219a). Thus, it
seems implausible that Socrates speaks genuinely here since
the characteristics of the feverish city radically conflict with
the asceticism portrayed in the rest of the Platonic corpus.
Thus, the education of the guardians in the feverish city
must be read within its ironic framework Surely teachers like
Plato and Socrates desire to provoke philosophical insight in
their students. Therefore, one fundamental question that
II
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mustbe addressed is whether the guardians are philosophers
or not. Before we pursue this issue, an important distinction
must be made. Socrates' development of the guardian class
changes in content and arguably in purpose. By Book V, the
guardians have donned a new nature and become philoso
pher-kings. While this move is certainly interesting, I will not
explore it fully. From this point on, any references to the
guardian class will describe the pre-Book V variety. Though
Socrates admits that the guardians will be "truly philo
sophic," there is good reason to believe that he speaks ironi
cally (Republic 376a}. After all, he repeatedly likens the guard
ians' philosophic nature to that of a dog (Republic 375a, e;
376a). Even his argument is steeped in irony. Socrates says of
a dog,
"When it sees someone it doesn't know, it's angry,
although it never had any bad experience with him.
And when it sees someone it knows, it greets him
warmly, even if it never had a good experience with
him." (Republic 376a)
The guardians are similar to the dog [i]n that it (the dog and
analogously the guardians) distinguishes friendly from hos
tile looks by nothing other than by having learned the one
and being ignorant of the other'" (Republic 376b). Socrates'
depiction of the guardians' philosophic nature describes
those who embrace anything that they know and are hostile
towards w hat they do not know. Surely, this desprciption is
of the fertile breeding-ground for just the sort of spoon
feeding and censorship that Socrates goes on to develop in
the construction of the city of pigs. Socrates intentionally
censors some information from the guardians and the rest of
the city hoping that in their "philosophic nature," their
ignorance will cultivate hostility. For example, Socrates cen
sors corrupting instances of poetry from the guardians' ears
because they are '''...poetic and sweet for the many to hear,
but the more poetic they are, the less should they be heard by
boys and men who must be free and accustomed to fearing
slavery more than deathl l l (Republic 387b). Socrates fears that
ill
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the lilting words of the poets may hinder a noble conception
of death - a vital characteristic for the guardian class. Thus,
poetry must be "rigidly censored and controlled." s Interest
ingly, Socrates' approach precludes presenting the guardian
class with all the evidence, trusting them to arrive at true
conclusions. Instead, Socrates wants to prohibit the possibil
ity of undesirable6 conclusions by censoring the evidence
altogether. Thus, the nature of this "philosophic nature," is
not philosophic at all; the guardians are not to think but
rather to mindlessly accept the education presented and
resent everything unknown. However, Socrates is renowned
for his elenchus, his knack for dliving his interlocutors to
aporia with the hope of newfound philosophical inSight. If
this elenchtic process remains a genuine aspect of his peda
gogy, it makes sense to label the education of the guardians
an exercise in mimetic irony.
If indeed Socrates is employing mimetic irony as I have
argued, then the education of the guardians does not assert
educational ideals, but attempts to bring the interlocutor, in
this case, Glaucon, to realize the mistakes of this paradigm.
Once the paradigm has been refuted (i.e. the interlocutor has
moved to aporia), then the ideal paradigm for paideia can be
voiced to new ears.
IV. The Allegory of the Cave as a Genuine Representation
of Ideal Paideia
A. Dramatic Context in the Allegory of the Cave
If mimetic irony is the basis for viewing the education of
the guardians in an aporietic schema, what is the justification
for regarding the cave as a genuine representation of ideal
paideia? Adding to the burden of the project is the fact that the
allegory of the cave is an allegory. At least the education of
the guardians speaks explicitly about education. The cave, on
the other hand, is an extended analogyi thus, one must argue
for interpreting the subject matter of the cave to be education
- or so it seems. Werner Jaeger makes an important observa
tion that lends credence to interpreting the cave as Socrates'
genuine concept of paideia:
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... few pay any attention to the first sentence of the
seventh book, which leads into the image of the cave.
There Plato actually states that it is anirnage ofpaideia:
or, more exactly, that it represents the nature of man,
and its relation to culture and "unculture," paideia
and apaideusia.(Jaeger 294)
With this observation firmly in place, it is safe to say that
Socrates presents this analogy as if an image of our nature in
its education and want of education..." (Republic 514a). This
explicit admission removes any doubt about the subject of
the cave. However, let me be perfectly clear about what this
overt admission proves. This explicit preface merely estab
lishes that Socrates wants Glaucon (and probably the rest of
us) to hear the cave as an analogy for education. That we
know the subject matter of Socrates' analogy tells us nothing
of whether Socrates means the allegory to be genuine or
ironic. To untangle this perplexity, we must look for more
clues as we move through the material of the cave.
Socrates begins the analogy by telling a story of human
prisoners who are perpetually shackled in an underground
cave. The large mouth of the cave moves upward toward the
light so that the entire width of the cave is exposed to light.
The prisoners are bound from childhood in such a manner
that they cannot move their heads and are therefore forced to
see only what is in front of them. With their backs to the
mouth of the cave, they only see the shadows projected by the
light onto the back walL
Glaucon's response to the introduction of the analogy is
important: I"It's a strange image ...and [strange] prisoners
you're telling of' /I (Republic 515a). Note the contrast between
Glaucon's response to the cave and his response to the
education of the guardians. With respect to the cave, Glaucon
is perplexed by the image from the very beginning. Thus, if
Glaucon is going to ultimately embrace the allegory of the
cave, he must first overcome his notion that the image seems
so bizarre. In contrast, since Glaucon's request for luxury in
the ideal state sparked the discussion of the education of the
guardians, he naturally had an affinity for the idea. Remem
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ber, when Socrates uses mimetic irony, he hopes that the
student will progress from a misguided affinity for a mis
taken notion to aporia. Once reduced to aporia, the interlocu
tor can accept new philosophic insight. Though we see at
least the initial stages of this progression in the education of
the guardians, the allegory of the cave presents a different
approach altogether. The fact that Glaucon does not readily
see the analogy of the cave lends weight to the notion that
Socrates means to be genuine here not only because the
pattern does not follow that of mimetic irony, but also be
cause the dramatic context portrays Glaucon as a real life
example of the allegory. If the allegory of the cave is in fact
meanttobe read as a paradigm fori deal paideia, then Glaucon' s
response is particularly fitting. Reasoning by analogy, Socrates
exposes Glaucon to the truth - the real world that is outside
thecave and illumined by the sun. Just as the cave dweller
who is compelled to see the real world finds it very strange at
first and then gradually realizes the truth of the things he
hears, so Glauconfinds Socrates' image very strange initially,
then progressively begins to think the image is right.
B. The Progressive Nahtre of Education
Socrates continues with the analogy supposing thatthese
prisoners who spent their whole life in the cave would
believe that the projected shadows of people walking outside
the cave were not merely images of real things but the real
things themselves: "' ...such men would hold that the truth is
nothing other than the shadows of artificial things'" (Republic
515c). Since this existence is all they have known, the cave
dwellers do not believe fhey are prisoners. But what if some
one on the outside, a non-cave dweller, released a prisoner
from his shackles and exposed him to the realities of life
external?

"What do you suppose he'd say if someone were to
tell him that before he saw silly nothings, while now,
because he is somewhat nearer to what is and more
turned toward beings, he sees more correctlYi and, in
particular, showing him each of the things that pass
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by, were to compel the man to answer his questions
about what they are? Don't you suppose he'd be at a
loss and believe that what was seen before is truer
than what is now shown?" (Republic 515dY
The initial response of the cave dweller to the real world is
disbelief. The power of conventionS still imprisons him as he
moves outside of the cave. Even when his eyes are '"full of its
(the light's) beam ...[he will still] be unable to see even one of
things now said to be true ...at least not right away'" (Republic
515a). Here Socrates hits on a fundamental point of paideia.
Light-bulbs do not flash as one realizes the good in a moment
of sudden epiphany. The nature of education is that it is
progressive. That is, it is a gradual process:
"Then I suppose he'd have to get accustomed, if he
were going to see what's up above. At first he'd most
easily make out the shadows, and after that the phan
toms of the human beings and the other things in
water; and, later, the things themselves. And from
there he could turn to beholding the things in heaven
and heaven itself, more easily at night - looking at
the light of the stars and the moon - than by day 
looking at the sun and sunlight." (Republic 516a-b).
If we follow the analogy, then we see that just as human eyes

that have spent a lifetime in darkness must take steps to be
able to see clearly in the sunlight, so too, the student who has
lived a lifetime in an aphilosophical world of darkness must
also take steps in order to see the good clearly.
It is also important to note the nature of the progression;
the cave dweller first sees the shadows - an entity that he is
accustomed to seeing. The next step of the progression is to
see reflections of real things in water. The images inwater are
closer representations of the real thing than shadows since
they have color and better-defined shape. Then the cave
dweller moves to the things in the heaven and the heaven
itself, a move to looking at real objects rather than mere
representations of real objects. The passage also indicates
that it will be easier for the cave dweller to see these real
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objects at night probably because they are less complex (less
hues and less intense light) than in the day when things are
fully colored and defined in their perfect complexity. At this
point, the cave dweller sees things as they really are.
In the same way the non-philosophical soul must also
make the same sort of progression, moving from things that
are less real (hazy representations of the good) to those things
which are more real (sharper depictions of the good) to real
things that are easiest to understand (the simple parts of the
good) to things that are fully real (the good in all its splendor
and glory). Thus, the ideal teacher does not begin by present
inghis philosophically immature studentto the good in all its
majesty and complexity, butbuilds up to it in small steps. For
example, an algebra student is taught concepts that perhaps
oversimplify concepts taught in calculus. However, those
simplistic concepts reflect a far more complex concept. To
understand the concepts of calculus one must first under
stand simpler notions taught in algebrai a student who has
not taken any algebra will have a very difficult time master
ing calculus.
The cave poignantly illustrates that education is not only
progressive in terms of the complexity and accuracy of the
material studied (progressing from vague representations of
the real to the real itself) but also progressive in terms of the
students! attitude towards it. Recall that the cave dweller is
"'compelled to stand up, to tum his neck around, to walk and
look up toward the light... (Republic 515c). Though free from
his chains, someone must still III drag him away from there
(the cave) byforce'" (Republic 515e). Initially, the student feels
absolutely repulsed. He wants to remain entrenched in the
comfort of ignorance, couched in convention. And surely the
student is partially right; for in order to see the good, one
must ascend the I"rough, steep, upward waylll (Republic
515e). Because the affinity for comfortable ignorance far
outweighs the trek for costly knowledge, the teacher must
"' ...drag him out into the light of the sun... 111 (Republic 515e).
distressed and annoyed at
Furthermore, the student is
being so dragged (Republic 515e-516a).9 However, as the
student progresses from vague representations of the good to
1fI
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the good itself, he also progresses from repulsion to affinity:
"'What then? When he recalled his first home and the wis
dom there, and his fellow prisoners in that time, don't you
suppose he would consider himself happy for the change and
pity the others?1II (Republic 516c). Thus, through the process
of education, the student not only learns progressively but
also loves learning progressively.
V. Conclusion
In a very real sense, pedagogy is always an eminent issue
in Plato's dialogues. Even when the subject of the dialogue is
not explicitly about education, the drama which portrays
Socrates' interactions with his students invariably deals with
Socratic pedagogy. So it makes sense to conclude with the
pedagogical progression we find in the drama of the Repub
lic. I have argued that Socrates' first attempt to teach Glaucon
about the nature of education employed mimetic irony. In
many ways mimetic irony is the best approach; for as Miller
notes, if the interlocutor can identify his misguided concep
tions freely, on his own, then the epiphany will have greater
"internal significance." However, what mimetic irony gains
in ends, it loses in means; for mimetic irony often requires
complete negation, wholesale abandonment of one's idea. If
the student is unable to see the error of his ways, he will not
reap the internal significance" Socrates desires.
To Socrates' credit, when Glauconfails to see the mimetic
irony of the feverish city, he wisely changes his approach.
Surely the task of interpreting an allegory is easier than the
negation required by mimetic irony. Glaucon merely has to
understand whatthe allegory symbolizes to reap the benefits
of its meaning. Interestingly, the easier approach may not
provide equally fruitful results. Recall that mimetic irony
dictates that Socrates intentionally limit himself from an
overt refutation so that the student arrives at his conclusions
freely. In contrast, the cave presents a conception in which the
student is compelled to see the good by force. If it is the
freedom in mimetic irony that cultivates the internal signifi
cance that Miller describes, then it is safe to say that when the
/I
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student is forced to see the good, the internal significance
may not be as profound.
However, all students are not created equal. While
Glaucon may not reap the benefits of rn:i.rnetic irony, Plato's
students, the readers, may very well be changed. That is the
beauty of drama, the reader is not relegated to passively
receiving the arguments presented. Instead, the very act of
reading the dialogue places the reader inside the dialogue.
The reader is indeed an interlocutor himself. As Miller notes,
IISocrates' examination of the interlocutor will be, for the
hearer, an opportunity for self-examina tion" (Miller 5). Even
if Socrates' students prove themselves dimwits, his efforts
are not in vaini for through clever mode of drama, Socrates'
. tenure as a teacher will live as long as its readers.
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NOTES

Education is receiving a great deal more attention from the secondary
literature. See, for example, Peter I-Iobson, "Is It Time for Another Look at
Plato? A Contemporary Assessment of His Educational TI,eory," Journal of
Thought (Fall-Winter 1993), 77-86. Also Egan Kieran, "Development of
Education," Journal ofPhilosophy and Education (1984), 187-193; Richard Taft,
"The Role of Compulsion in the Education of the Philosopher-King,"
Auslegung (Winter 1982),311-332; Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Plato's Philosophy
of Education: The Meno Experiment and the Republic Curriculum;"
Educational Theory (Summer 1970), 207-228.
2 This is the argument of Drew Hyland, "Taking the longer road: The Irony
of Plato's Republic," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale (July-September
1988),317-335.
3 Some dramatic interpreters include Paul Friedlander, Charles Griswold,
Drew Hyland, Jacob Klein, David Lachterman, Mitchell Miller, David
Roochnik, Stanley Rosen, and Leo Strauss.
4 Quite an ironic name for an ideal city - taken from 373c.
5 See Alexander Nehamas, "Plato and the Mass Media/' Monist (April 1988)
214-31.
6 By undesirable, I mean that Socrates wants to prohibit the guardians from
even considering something contrary to the ideal for fear that they may be
corrupted.
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Again, this is just the sort of response we see in Gloucon when Socrates
begins the analogy of the cave (515a).
S Both the convention of those in his environment and the convention that
he himself has sensorily experienced to be true in his environment.
9 In light of the predicament of the cave dwellers, it is clear that the teacher
is absolutely necessary if philosophic insight is to occur. The cave dweller
will never leave the prison on his own, only the teacher can forcibly free him
from his shackles.
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